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NOTES 
Enforcement of TSCA and the Federal Five-Year Statute of 
Limitations for Penalty Actions 
Teresa A. Holderer 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976i 
(TSCA) to tackle the known and unknown dangers many chemicals 
pose to human health.2 In TSCA, Congress granted the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA or "the Agency") broad authority to pro-
mulgate and enforce regulations specifying testing, reporting, and 
record keeping requirements for manufacturers and processors of 
chemical substances. 3 Congress also granted EPA the power to re-
strict, regulate, and prohibit the manufacture, handling, processing, 
and distribution of substances that present an unreasonable risk of in-
jury to human health or the environment. 4 The Agency can bring an 
action in federal court for specific enforcement and for seizure of 
chemicals manufactured, processed, or distributed in violation of 
TSCA, 5 but its primary enforcement tool is the assessment of adminis-
trative penalties under section 16 of the Act. 6 
Although TSCA prescribes various tools for effective enforcement, 
neither the statute nor the regulations contain any statute of limita-
tions specifying how quickly EPA must initiate such enforcement ac-
tivities. The lack of an express statute of limitations leaves entities 
regulated by the Act unable to experience repose and unsure of when 
1. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988)). 
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (1988) (findings of Congress). 
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2604, 2615 (1988). Section 15 ofTSCA declares that it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person to fail to comply with its provisions or any of EPA's regulations, including 
reporting and record keeping requirements. It also forbids the use for commercial purposes of 
any chemical substance or mixture by a person who has reason to know that the substance was 
manufactured, processed, or distributed in violation of any EPA dictates. 15 U.S.C. § 2614 
(1988). 
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2605 (1988). Probably the best known substances regulated extensively 
under TSCA are Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) and asbestos. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 761.1-
761.218, 763.60-763.179 (1991). 
5. 15 u.s.c. § 2616 (1988). 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1988). Congress also provided citizens the right to bring actions to 
restrain violations or to compel EPA to perform its duties under TSCA. 15 U.S.C. § 2619 
(1988). Citizen suits have not been a factor in TSCA enforcement, however, perhaps because of 
the public's lack of access to corporate files to detect violations. For an example of a citizen suit 
under TSCA, see Pottstown Indus. Complex v. P.T.I. Servs. Inc., No. 91-5660, 1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3256 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1992). 
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they can discard voluminous records which they might need someday 
in litigation. Further, in the absence of a statute of limitations, BP A 
has less incentive to prosecute suspected TSCA violations promptly. 
In fact, because penalties can reach $25,000 for each violation, and 
each day counts as a separate violation for some violations, 7 the 
Agency has an incentive to delay enforcement in order to recover 
higher penalty amounts. 
Many years prior to TSCA, Congress enacted a general five-year 
statute of limitations for actions for the enforcement of civil penalties, 
fines, and forfeitures, 8 which, if applicable, would alleviate these 
problems. Although the Agency claims that no statute of limitations 
applies, this Note argues that the general five-year statute of limita-
tions, found in section 2462 of title 28, should apply to BP A's adminis-
trative proceedings to assess penalties as well as to later collection 
actions in federal courts. Part I details TSCA's enforcement proce-
dures, which create special difficulties when applying section 2462's 
statute of limitations. Part I also examines how BP A, industry, and 
agency judges have interpreted section 2462 as applied to TSCA en-
forcement. It concludes by summarizing the considerations that a 
court must address when faced with the issue. Part II analyzes gen-
eral principles of statutory construction, congressional discussions of 
section 2462, court decisions in related administrative areas, and gen-
eral purposes of statutes of limitations. It argues that applying section 
2462 to EP A's assessment of penalties as well as to district court pro-
ceedings is consistent with established principles and appropriately re-
solves the issue. Part III asserts that separate five-year periods should 
apply to the Agency's assessment of penalties and to collection actions 
in federal court. Part III also discusses when each of these actions 
should accrue. This Note concludes that applying section 2462 sepa-
rately to administrative penalty proceedings and to federal court col-
lection actions best promotes the public's interest in enforcing TSCA 
while protecting industry's right to be free from stale claims. 
I. TSCA's ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL PENALTIES 
AND THE GENERAL FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
To decide whether section 2462 applies to TSCA enforcement, a 
court must understand both the Act's enforcement mechanism and the 
language of section 2462. Section I.A describes the Act's enforcement 
framework for the assessment of penalties. Section I.B examines the 
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l) (1988). 
8. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 974 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988)). The 
"Historical and Revision Notes" following 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) make clear the section is 
based on title 28 U.S.C. § 791 (1940). Further,§ 791 itself"appears to have had its genesis in the 
Act of March 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 627, c. 22 .•.. " Smith v. United States, 143 F.2d 228, 229 (9th 
Cir. 1944); see also United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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federal statute of limitations for enforcement of penalties and the de-
bate over its application to TSCA. This Part concludes by identifying 
the key issues which a court must address to resolve the controversy 
regarding section 2462's application to TSCA. 
A. TSCA ~ Enforcement Framework 
Courts often describe enforcement of civil penalties under TSCA 
as a two-tier process - an administrative penalty assessment and a 
collection action in district court.9 Section 16(a) of TSCA provides 
that EPA "shall" assess civil penalties for violations of the Act. 10 Un-
like under other environmental statutes, the Agency's administrative 
action to assess penalties under TSCA is a mandatory prerequisite to 
an EPA penalty action in federal court. 11 In this first, mandatory 
stage, EPA retains wide discretion in assessing the amount of the pen-
alties and in enforcing payment of the penalty. It must take into ac-
count various- factors in assessing the penalty, including the nature, 
circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, the violator's abil-
ity to pay, and the violator's prior compliance record. 12 TSCA does 
not, however, require that EPA weigh these factors in any particular 
manner. 13 Moreover, the Agency has discretion to modify or compro-
mise any civil penalty assessment with or without conditions.14 
EPA initiates the administrative action under the Act by filing an 
administrative complaint. After the violator has had the opportunity 
for a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) assesses a penalty on 
behalf of the Agency by issuing an order.15 Either the Agency or the 
violator can appeal the order to the Environmental Appeals Board.16 
If an alleged violator still believes it has not committed a violation or 
9. See, e.g., United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1462-63 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 14, 1988); In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 8 at *20 (Aug. 7, 1989); 
In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13 at *5 (Apr. 7, 1989). 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (1988). 
11. Other environmental statutes permit EPA to choose whether to assess a penalty adminis-
tratively or to file an immediate action in district court. See, e.g., Clean Water Act (CWA), § 2, 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1321 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976 (RCRA), § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988)); Clean Air Act, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988 & 
Supp. II 1990). Prior to the 1990 amendments, civil penalties could only be imposed by an action 
in federal court. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) (1988). 
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) (1988). EPA has issued guidelines on how it will weigh 
the various factors. Guidelines for the Assessment of Civil Penalties Under § 16 of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,770 (1980). In addition, EPA is subject to requirements 
of the Administrative Procedures Act; a reviewing court will set aside a decision that is "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706 (1988). 
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(C) (1988). 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (1988). 
16. Intra-agency appeals were heard by Chief Judicial Officers until March 1992. See infra 
not~ 36-39 and accompanying text. 
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that the penalty is excessive following the administrative appeal, it can 
contest the Agency's action by appealing to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals.17 The penalty assessed becomes final if the alleged violator 
chooses not to appeal, or upon the Court of Appeal's issuance of its 
final judgment.18 The violator thus becomes obligated to pay the civil 
penalty, and interest begins to accumulate.19 At this point, the viola-
tor can gain no further advantage by delaying payment of the penalty, 
and therefore, most entities pay the order or judgment without further 
action by EPA.20 
The second stage of TSCA enforcement takes place only if the vio-
lator fails to pay the penalty. The Attorney General will file an action 
in district court on behalf of BP A to recover the amount assessed plus 
accumulated interest.21 At this stage, the court cannot review the va-
lidity, amount, or appropriateness of the penalty.22 Therefore, the dis-
trict court action, if one does become necessary, is purely mechanical 
and only implements the Agency's enforcement activities.23 
Thus, TSCA enforcement consists of two distinct steps - adminis-
trative assessment and collection through a district court. TSCA does 
not expressly prescribe a statute of limitations for either stage. As the 
next section describes, however, Congress has enacted a general stat-
ute of limitations which potentially applies to TSCA enforcement. 
B. The General Five-Year Statute of Limitations and Its Application 
to TSCA 
Section 2462 of Title 28 contains a general statute of limitations for 
actions for the enforcement of civil penalties: "Except as otherwise 
provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the 
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or 
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years 
from the date when the claim first accrued .... "24 
On its face, section 2462 appears to apply broadly to all proceed-
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(3) (1988). 
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(3)-(4) (1988). This assumes the parties do not appeal the decision to 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(4) (1988). 
20. As evidence that most violators pay the civil penalty once they can no longer contest its 
amount, a LEXIS search conducted on January 27, 1993, revealed only three district court col-
lection actions under TSCA. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (stating that TSCA penalties were only part of a larger dispute), ajfd., 978 F.2d 
832 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct. 
14, 1988); United States v. Holloway Oil Co., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1190 (M.D. Fla. July 
26, 1988). 
21. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(4) (1988). 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(4) (1988). 
23. See In re District of Columbia (Lorton Prison Facility), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA 
LEXIS 12, at *15 (Aug. 30, 1991). 
24. 28 u.s.c. § 2462 (1988). 
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ings by the government relating to civil penalties. However, sharp dis-
agreement has arisen between EPA and industry regarding whether 
the Agency's administrative penalty assessment proceeding is an "ac-
tion, suit or proceeding for the enforcement" of a civil penalty. EPA 
claims that its penalty assessment action is not such a proceeding, and 
thus no statute of limitations applies. It argues that courts must con-
strue section 2462 narrowly because it is a derogation of sovereignty.25 
Under a strict construction, only the district court collection stage of 
TSCA enforcement is a "proceeding for the enforcement" of a civil 
penalty.26 Industry, on the other hand, takes a more expansive view of 
enforcement proceedings and would include EP A's administrative 
proceedings under TSCA. 27 
EPA also asserts that section 2462's presence in a title of the 
United States Code regulating federal courts and the lack of direct leg-
islative history linking section 2462 to administrative proceedings mili-
tate against its applicability to the Agency's initial assessment of 
TSCA penalties.28 Industry counters that section 2462's codification 
in title 28 does not determine its application. It relies on several con-
gressional pronouncements on section 2462's applicability and deci-
sions by courts in other administrative areas to demonstrate that 
section 2462 should apply to administrative proceedings under 
TSCA.29 
Finally, EPA and industry dispute when a penalty action "ac-
crues." Section 2462 offers no guidance on this issue. The Agency 
asserts that an action accrues under TSCA only upon EP A's issuance 
of a final order or the Court of Appeal's issuance of a final judgment, 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 42-49. 
26. E.g., Complainant's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss at 
9-21, 31-33, In re CWM Chem. Servs., Inc., No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 21 
(Nov. 6, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal No. 91-6, 1992 WL 90321 (Mar. 23, 1992); EPA's Motion 
to Strike Affirmative Defense at 11-13, In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 8, 
at *20 (Aug. 7, 1989), modified, TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6 (Feb. 28, 1992). 
27. E.g., Motion of Bethlehem Steel Corporation to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for an 
Accelerated Decision at 11-16, In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. TSCA-III-322, 1991 WL 
328113 (Dec. 23, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal No. 92-1, 1992 WL 118,796 (May 12, 1992); Reply 
Brief of Respondent, Bethlehem Steel Corporation at 9-15, Bethlehem Steel, TSCA Appeal No. 
92-1; Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 8-9, 16-17, CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-
91-0213; Response to Complainant's First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 13-22, 3M, 
No. TSCA-88-H-06; Response to Complainant's Reply to Response to Complainant's First Mo-
tion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 9-17, 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06. 
28. See Complainant's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 
25-31, CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213; Complainant's Reply to Response to Complainant's 
First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 8-13, 21, 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06; infra notes 98-
106 and accompanying text. 
29. See Reply Brief of Respondent, Bethlehem Steel Corporation at 60-62, Bethlehem Steel, 
TSCA Appeal No. 92-1; Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 9-11, CWM, No. II 
TSCA-PCB-91-0213; Response to Complainant's First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 
7-13, 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06; infra notes 107-08, 114-30 and accompanying text. 
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whichever occurs later. 30 Industry believes the action accrues at the 
time of the alleged violation.31 
Until recently, the issue of section 2462's application to TSCA ac-
tions remained unsettled even at the agency level. In 1983, the first 
ALJ to face the issue dismissed one count of EP A's administrative 
complaint because it related to a violation which had occurred more 
than five years before the filing of the administrative complaint.32 The 
ALJ accepted, without discussion, the respondent's assertion that sec-
tion 2462 barred the claim.33 Almost six years later, in 1989, several 
ALJs ruled that no statute of limitations applies to administrative ac-
tions to assess penalties under TSCA.34 In 1991, however, two ALJs 
in three separate matters took a different view and decided that section 
2462 does apply to administrative actions under the Act. Accord-
ingly, they dismissed claims relating to violations occurring more than 
five years before EPA filed its administrative complaint. 35 
The Agency resolved its internal controversy the following year. 
In In re 3M, 36 the Chief Judicial Officer, formerly EPA's appellate 
level,37 ruled that no statute of limitations applies to administrative 
proceedings under TSCA. He concluded that the ALJ had ruled 
properly that section 2462 applies only to an action in district court to 
recover a penalty, and that the action cannot accrue until the agency 
has finally determined the amount.38 The newly created Environmen-
30. Complainant's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss at 21-25, 
CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213; EPA's Motion to. Strike Affirmative Defense at 14-15, 3M, 
No. TSCA-88-H-06. 
31. E.g., Motion of Bethlehem Steel Corporation to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for an 
Accelerated Decision at 16-18, Bethlehem Steel. No. TSCA-III-322; Reply Brief of Respondent, 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation at 43-59, Bethlehem Steel, TSCA Appeal No. 92-1; Response to 
Complainant's First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 22-31, 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06; 
Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 20-24, CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213. 
32. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., No. TSCA-V-C-133, 1983 TSCA LEXIS 14 (Dec. 1, 
1983). 
33. Commonwealth Edison, No. TSCA-V-C-133. 
34. In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06; In re Rollins Envt. Servs., Inc., No. II-TSCA-PCB-
88-0116, 1988 TSCA LEXIS 12 (Sept. 28, 1990); In re Energy Sys. Co., No. TSCA-VI-408C 
(June 16, 1989); In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13 (Apr. 7, 1989). 
Of these, the 3M and Tremco decisions are the more complete, addressing at length the argu-
ments raised by both parties. To underscore the importance which industry and EPA attached 
to the issue by 1989, the parties to 3M devoted 124 pages of briefs to discussion of their statute of 
limitations arguments. 
35. Bethlehem Steel, No. TSCA-111-322; CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213; In re District of 
Columbia (Lorton Prison Facilify), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 12 (Aug. 30, 1991). 
Lorton Prison is the counterpoint to 3M and Tremco; after examining at length decisions in other 
administrative areas, congressional comments on § 2462, and general policy, the AU reached 
the opposite conclusion. 
36. In re 3M Co., TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6 (Feb. 28, 1992). 
37. Chief Judicial Officers formerly handled all appeals from AU penalty decisions. On 
March 1, 1992, they were replaced by the Environmental Appeals Board, which is a three-mem-
ber panel. 57 Fed. Reg. 5320 (1992) (to be codified in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.). 
38. 3M, TSCA Appeal No. 90-3. 
March 1993] Note - TSCA Statute of Limitations 1029 
tal Appeals Board followed 3M and reversed the two ALJs who had 
found that section 2462 could bar administrative penalty proceed-
ings. 39 3M appealed its decision to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit,40 which will likely rule in 1993. 
The D.C. Circuit will confront a two-tier enforcement process with 
no express statute of limitations, a federal statute of limitations for 
penalty actions located in a judicial code, and doctrines of sovereign 
immunity and strict construction. The next Part considers these fac-
tors and concludes that section 2462 applies to EP A's assessment of 
penalties under TSCA. 
II. SECTION 2462 AND EPA's AsSESSMENT OF PENALTIES 
This Part concentrates on section 2462's application to TSCA's ad-
ministrative proceedings, because there appears to be a consensus 
among courts, EPA, and industry that section 2462 applies to district 
court actions to collect penalties.41 This Part demonstrates that ad-
ministrative penalty assessments under TSCA are "proceedings for the 
enforcement of" a civil penalty and that section 2462's presence in the 
judicial code does not preclude its application to EPA proceedings. 
Section II.A examines the argument that strict construction should 
apply when a party asserts a statute of limitations against the govern-
39. See In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., TSCA Appeal No. 92-1, 1992 WL 118796 (May 12, 
1992); In re CWM Chem. Servs., Inc., TSCA Appeal No. 91-6, 1992 WL 90321 (Mar. 23, 1992). 
40. 3M Co. v. EPA, No. 92-1126 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 27, 1992). CWMandBethlehem Steel 
also filed appeals. CWM Chem. Servs., Inc. v. Reilly, No. 92-1177 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 21, 
1992), dismissed, No. 92-1177, 1992 WL 390882 (Dec. 10, 1992); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 
No. 92-1225 (D.C. Cir. filed May 22, 1992), dismissed, No. 92-1225 (Jan. 29, 1993). Of the three, 
only 3M is an appeal of a final order. CWM and Bethlehem Steel had argued that because the 
statute of limitations issue is dispositive of the outcome of the litigation, the issue should not 
await a final order assessing penalties. However, on December 10, the court dismissed the CWM 
appeal as not ready for review. CWM, No. 92-1177; see also 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1583 
(Dec. 18, 1992) (discussing CWM). Following the CWM dismissal, EPA and Bethlehem Steel 
filed a joint motion for dismissal of the Bethlehem Steel appeal which the court granted. Bethle-
hem Steel, No. 92-1225 (Jan. 29, 1993). 
41. Although United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 
1982), provides some support for an argument that § 2462 does not apply to a mere collection 
action in district court (see infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text), EPA has not seriously 
questioned the application of§ 2462 to district court actions under TSCA. In United States v. 
N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1464 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988), the court noted that 
both parties correctly acknowledged that § 2462 applied to an action to collect a penalty assessed 
under TSCA but differed on when the action accrued. See also In re 3M Co., TSCA Appeal No. 
90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6, at *32 (Feb. 28, 1992) (holding§ 2462 inapplicable to administrative 
penalty actions as opposed to court proceedings to enforce an administrative penalty); In re 
Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13, at *11 (Apr. 7, 1989) (finding§ 2462 
inapplicable to administrative actions but appropriate for district court actions). Indeed, courts 
have applied § 2462 to district court proceedings that followed administrative penalty assess-
ments under a variety oflegislative schemes. E.g., United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 
1987) and United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985) (Export Administration 
Act); United States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act); United States v. C & R Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) 
(Clean Water Act). 
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ment and concludes that although the government is the plaintiff in 
TSCA penalty actions, strict construction of 2462 is not appropriate. 
Section II.B argues that even if a court must strictly construe section 
2462, EP A's administrative actions under TSCA are proceedings "for 
the enforcement of" civil penalties within the meaning of section 2462. 
Section II.C rebuts the argument that section 2462's codification in the 
judicial code implies a congressional intent to exclude administrative 
proceedings from its purview. The section explains that every time a 
congressional committee addressed section 2462 in written reports 
dealing with administrative proceedings, it stated that section 2462 ap-
plies. Although no federal court has directly faced the issue, section 
II.D examines cases in which courts have assumed or stated that sec-
tion 2462 applies to administrative penalty actions. Section II.D con-
cludes that because courts recognize that section 2462 applies to 
administrative actions for assessment of penalties in some contexts, its 
language requires that it must apply to actions under TSCA unless 
Congress explicitly states otherwise. Finally, section II.E asserts that 
applying section 2462 only to district court proceedings under TSCA 
would defeat the purposes of statutes of limitations. 
A. Sovereign Immunity and Strict Construction 
Statutes of limitations do not bind the United States unless Con-
gress expressly so provides.42 This common law principle originated 
from the English belief that immunity from limitations periods was an 
essential prerogative of sovereignty.43 Today, the principle remains vi-
able because it rests on the important policy of preserving public rights 
and revenues, vested in the government for the protection of all, from 
the carelessness of public officers who fail to take timely action.44 
Congress can, and sometimes does, create a cause of action for the 
government without specifying a statute of limitations.45 If a statute 
granting the government a cause of action contains no statute of limi-
tations, the courts must examine general statutes of limitations created 
by Congress.46 If none of the general statutes of limitations apply, the 
42. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 133 (1938); E.I. Dupont de Nemours 
& Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924); United States v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 246 U.S. 552, 
561 (1918); United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981). 
43. Guaranty Trust, 304 U.S. at 132; United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis 
Ry., 118 U.S. 120, 125 (1886); Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 339. 
44. Guaranty Trust, 304 U.S. at 132; Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 339; United States v. 
Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1980). 
45. Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 339. 
46. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) provides a general statute of limitations of five 
years for fine, penalty, and forfeiture actions. In comparison, 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1988) requires 
the government to bring a tort action within three years and contract or quasi-contract action 
within six years. 
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government can bring an action at any time.47 
As a corollary to governmental immunity, courts accept that stat-
utes of limitations that purportedly apply to the government must be 
strictly construed in its favor.48 This means that courts will read the 
statute closely and rigidly and will not broaden the statute's reach by 
implication. Further, where a statute is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, courts will choose the reading which favors the govem-
ment. 49 The application of strict construction by courts may seem in-
appropriate when Congress and state legislatures have largely erased 
the government's immunity from statutes of limitations. 50 Indeed, 
courts have occasionally construed statutes of limitations broadly to 
include the government. 51 Within the past decade, however, the 
47. E.g., United States v. Tri-No Enter., 819 F.2d 154, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding no 
statute of limitations applies to actions to collect reclamation fees under the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act); Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 341 (holding no statute of 
limitations applies to an action by the United States to recover its share of the sale price of a 
hospital built with federal grant money). 
48. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984); E.I. Dupont de Nemours & 
Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924); United States v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 246 U.S. 552, 
561 (1918); Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 
85 (1992). 
49. See, e.g., Dupont, 264 U.S. at 462; Whited & Wheless, 246 U.S. at 561. For a definition of 
"strict construction," see BLACK'S LAW DrcnoNARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990); WILLIAM P. STAT-
SKY ET AL., WEST'S LEGAL DESK REFERENCE 208 (1991). 
50. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1252 
(1950) (cited with approval in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 467-68 n.14 
(1975)). The author argues that "[i]n view of the apparent absence of sound policy ground for 
the sovereign exemption, complete repudiation of the rule would seem desirable." Id. at 1253. 
One federal judge has argued that the government should not be exempt from limitations peri-
ods: "in my judgment, they should sound the horn in other fields and send the hounds to follow 
trails which are not so stale, for lex dilationes semper exho"et ('the law abhors delay') is a better 
rule than nullum tempus occurrit regi [no lapse of time bars the King]." United States v. Wein-
traub, 613 F.2d 612, 626 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980) (Merritt, J., dissent-
ing) (citation omitted). 
51. For example, in Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59 (1953), the 
Supreme Court ruled that a statute of limitations which did not explicitly include the government 
nevertheless barred the government's action to recover liquidated damages under the Walsh-
Healey Act, ch. 881 § 1, 49 Stat. 2036 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1988)), for the 
employment of child labor. The Court rejected the government's contention that the statute of 
limitations at issue only applied to suits by employees. The Court observed that the statute 
applied to " 'any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or 
liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey 
Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act.' " Unexcelled Chem., 345 U.S. at 61 (quoting Portal-to-Portal Act 
of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 87, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1988))). The Co1:1rt then 
reasoned that because only the government could bring actions for liquidated damages under the 
referenced acts, the statute must, by implication, include the government. Unexcelled Chem., 345 
U.S. at 63. A strict construction of the statute would not have permitted such an implication. 
The Court further stated that this construction was proper even if it would prejudice the 
power of the government to safeguard the public interest. Unexcel/ed Chem., 345 U.S. at 666; see 
also United States v. Gary Bridges Logging & Coal Co., 570 F. Supp. 531, 532 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) 
(''The government's position that no limitation period applies [to an action to collect mine recla-
mation fees] is untenable.''). The Gary Bridges court held that either the general six-year limita-
tion for federal contract actions or a limitations period in the Internal Revenue Code for the 
collection of excise taxes must apply. Gary Bridges. 510 F. Supp. at 532. Yet the statute of 
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Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of this interpretive 
principle favoring the government. s2 
But, even if strict construction of statutes of limitations in favor of 
the government persists, it should not be invoked when considering 
section 2462's application to a governmental penalty action. As a co-
rollary to the principle that statutes of limitations do not apply against 
the government unless Congress provides otherwise, strict construc-
tion favoring the government should logically not apply when Con-
gress plainly subjects the government to a limiting statute.s3 
Sutherland's treatise on statutory construction supports the distinction 
between statutes of limitations like section 2462 that clearly include 
the government, and those that. do not: "Where a statute expressly 
includes the government there is no room for the operation of the 
[strict construction] rule, and a statute of this nature, like any other, is 
entitled to receive a sensible and reasonable treatment."s4 
Often when courts have applied strict construction they were ex-
amining statutes of limitations that did not expressly include the gov-
ernment. Significantly, the statute of limitations at issue in E.L 
Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, ss the leading case cited for the 
principle of strict construction, ·did not expressly include the govern-
ment. The provision construed by the Court provided: "'[a]ll actions 
at law by carriers, subject to this Act for recovery of their charges ... 
shall be begun within three years .... ' "S6 Defendants argued that 
this provision precluded the government from recovering demurrage 
charges that accrued during the period of federal control of the rail-
ways. The Court observed that title IV of the Transportation Act, 
which contained the statute of limitations, applied to "common carri-
ers. "s7 On the other hand, provisions relating to government control 
limitations in the IRC expressly applies only to excise taxes imposed under the IRC, not to those 
imposed under other statutes. 
52. Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 391 (stating that it "long ago pronounced the standard: 'Statutes 
of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government, must receive a strict construc-
tion in favor of the Government.' " (quoting Dupont, 264 U.S. at 462). However, the statute of 
limitations which the Court construed in Badaracco explicitly excluded actions of the type before 
the Court, and therefore, the principle of strict construction was not necessary to the result. 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 
U.S. 905 (1980) ("[A]n exception to that general rule exists when the sovereign (through the 
legislature) expressly imposes a limitation period upon itself."). 
54. 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.02 (4th ed. 1986). In Developments in 
the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 50, at 1190, the author asserts that where the right 
involved in the statute may be exercised only by the sovereign, a statute limiting the right will be 
construed strictly against the state. The author's blanket assertion must be qualified, as this 
notion appears to have been referenced only in actions against taxpayers. E.g., United States v. 
Updike, 281 U.S. 489, 496 (1930). While Unexcelled Chem., 345 U.S. 59, see discussion supra 
note 51, may be analyzed on this basis, the Supreme Court never stated that it intended to con· 
strue the statute strictly against the government. 
55. 264 U.S. 456, 460 (1924). 
56. 264 U.S. at 459 (quoting Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 459, 491-92). 
57. 264 U.S. at 460-61 (referring to§ 400 of Transportation Act, 41 Stat. at 474). 
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of the railways were contained in a separate section of the Transporta-
tion Act. 58 Because the Act separated provisions relating to the gov-
ernment from those governing other carriers, the Court held that the 
United States was not a carrier within the meaning of the statute and 
therefore could recover demurrage charges accruing more than three 
years prior to the action. s9 In contrast to Title IV of the Transporta-
tion Act, section 2462 applies primarily to the government and there-
fore should not be strictly construed. 60 
The remaining category .of cases that invoke strict construction in-
volves attempts by defendants to recharacterize the government's 
cause of action in order to fit within a general statute of limitations. 61 
These cases likewise do not dictate application of strict construction to 
section 2462 for a penalty action. In United States v. Whited & Whe-
less, Ltd., 62 the defendant asked the Supreme Court to bar an action 
based on a six-year statute of limitations for bringing actions to vacate 
government grants of public land. The Court held that the limitations 
period did not apply to the action by the government to recover the 
value of the land as damages for deceit and fraud by the defendant in 
procuring the grant. 63 Because the government did not bring a cause 
of action to vacate the grant, the limitations period could not apply. 
This case can be distinguished from cases that involve causes of action 
that clearly fit within the statute of limitations. It therefore does not 
require strict construction of section 2462 for a penalty action. 
Similarly, in United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 64 the 
defendant sought to characterize the government's cause of action 
either as a contract action barred by the general fec,leral statute of limi-
tations for contract claims65 or as an action to recover money diverted 
from a grant program barred by a limitation contained in the federal 
grant program. The Fifth Circuit characterized the government's ac-
tion as an action to recover its share of the sale price of a hospital built 
with federal grant money, and therefore neither statute of limitations 
cited by the defendant could apply. 66 Again, the government's cause 
58. 264 U.S. at 461 (referring to title II of Transportation Act). 
59. 264 U.S. at 459-60. 
60. See infra note 94. 
61. See, e.g., United States v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 246 U.S. 552 (1918); United States v. 
City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); United 
States v. Fire Ring Fuels, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Ky. 1991); United States v. Hawk Con-
tracting, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. 
Mich. 1955). 
62. 246 U.S. 552, 560 (1918). 
63. 246 U.S. at 563. 
64. 635 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1981). 
65. 28 u.s.c. § 2415 (1988). 
66. Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 341. 
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of action did not clearly fit within the statute of limitations in the way 
that penalty actions fit within section 2462. 
Courts construing section 2462 have generally adopted this reason-
ing which limits use of strict construction to cases in which defendants 
attempt to recharacterize an action to fit within a statute of limita-
tions. 67 Most courts faced with a clear penalty action do not even 
mention the principle of strict construction. 68 Mullikin v. United 
States 69 represents a rare federal case in which the court applied strict 
construction of section 2462 to a penalty action. 
Mullikin, however, is clearly distinguishable from a penalty action 
under TSCA. Mullikin involved an action by the IRS under section 
6701 of the Internal Revenue Code70 to recover penalties assessed 
against an accountant who fraudulently prepared a client's tax returns. 
The court observed that section 2462 does not apply if Congress pro-
vides otherwise. 71 Because the Internal Revenue Code expressly con-
tains a statute of limitations, the court found that Congress had 
"otherwise provided."72 Because the statute of limitations contained 
in the code could have covered actions under section 6701, but did not 
expressly, no statute of limitations applied to the government's ac-
tion. 73 The court also found that Congress intended that no statute 
limit actions under section 6701, which was designed to give the IRS 
substantial latitude to combat fraud by third-party advisers. 74 In con-
trast, TSCA does not contain a statute of limitations, and there is no 
evidence that Congress intended no limitations period to apply to ac-
tions under the Act. 1s 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Hawk Contracting, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (find-
ing that an action to collect mine reclamation fees, which is a fee under the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 on each ton of coal produced, is not a fine or penalty 
subject to § 2462's limitation); United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Mich. 1955) 
(holding that action by government to recover amount which subcontractors paid as kickbacks to 
obtain the subcontracts was not a penal sanction because the amount of kickback equaled the 
amount by which the government had been damaged). Both Davio and Hawk Contracting actu-
ally refer to the principle of strict construction. See also United States v. Fire Ring Fuels, Inc., 
788 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (reaching the same result as Hawk Contracting without refer-
ence to the principle); United States v. Weaver, 207 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1953) (finding without 
explicit reference to the principle that an action to recover money from defendants for their 
allegedly obtaining property by fraudulent means is compensatory in nature and not an action for 
a civil penalty and therefore § 2462 could not bar the action). 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Core 
Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985); H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 
819 (1st Cir. 1965). 
69. 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). 
70. I.R.C. § 6701 (1988). 
71. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 929. 
72. 952 F.2d at 929. 
73. 952 F.2d at 929. 
74. 952 F.2d at 928. 
75. The mere fact that TSCA contains no statute of limitations is not evidence that Congress 
intended that none apply. The Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
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Finally, from its language, Congress apparently intended section 
2462 to constitute a broad waiver of the government's right to be free 
from the operation of statutes of limitations. Section 2462 declares, 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or 
proceeding ... shall not be entertained .... " 76 Such a waiver of 
government immunity applies across the board, and the principle of 
strict construction should be rendered inapplicable.77 The First Cir-
cuit's decision in H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury18 sup-
ports this position. In H.P. Lambert, the Secretary of the Treasury 
ordered the forfeiture of a customhouse broker's license due to the 
broker's misconduct over a thirteen-year period. The broker claimed 
that section 2462 barred the Secretary from basing forfeiture on mis-
conduct occurring more than five years before commencement of the 
forfeiture proceeding. The First Circuit agreed with the broker, find-
ing that language in the relevant statute that " '[t]he collector ... may 
at any time, for good and sufficient reasons, serve notice in writing 
upon any customhouse broker' " could not prevent section 2462's ap-
plication to the forfeiture action. 79 Although the First Circuit admit-
ted that the phrase "at any time," if taken literally, might suggest that 
no time limit applied, it concluded that "the general policy of statutes 
of limitations is so deeply ingrained in our legal system that a period of 
limitations made generally applicable to such proceedings, as is section 
2462, is not to be avoided unless that purpose is made manifestly 
clear."80 
Thus, Dupont, Whited & Wheless, City of Palm Beach, and Mulli-
kin, the key cases that potentially support a strict construction of sec-
and the Clean Air Act (prior to the 1990 amendments) contain no statute of limitations, yet 
courts routinely apply § 2462 to them. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. Moreover, 
Congress specifically designed § 2462 to cover penalty actions arising under statutes which do 
not contain statutes of limitations. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) (emphasis added). 
77. See H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1965); United 
States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1464 n.6 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988) ("The 
use of limiting statutes against the state is disfavored by courts because it derogates the sovereign 
function. But since Congress itself has stated that section 2462 applies, absent a contrary legisla-
tive command, to the enforcement 'of any civil ... penalty,' the court must apply section 2462." 
(citations omitted)). The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. P/B STCO 213, ON 527 979, 756 
F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1985), rejected the government's contention that no statute of limitations 
applied to an action under the Clean Water Act to recover cleanup costs because the CWA 
contained no statute of limitations. The court acknowledged that the CWA contains no limita-
tions period, but it found that "Congress has enacted a general statute of limitations, however, 
and it is applicable across-the-board to all actions brought by the United States if they are 
'founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact' (six years) or 'founded upon a tort' 
(three years)." P/B STCO, 756 F.2d at 368 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982)). The court 
neither mentioned nor applied strict construction and found that an action to recover cleanup 
costs is most like an action based on quasi-contract, thus the general six-year statute of limita-
tions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1982) governed. P/B STCO, 756 F.2d at 370. 
78. 354 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1965). 
79. H.P. Lambert, 354 F.2d at 822 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (1964)). 
80. 354 F.2d at 822. 
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tion 2462, do not require such an interpretation in TSCA proceedings. 
Unlike the statute at issue in Dupont, section 2462 clearly applies to 
the government. Unlike the situations in Whited & Wheless and City 
of Palm Beach, the government's cause of action under TSCA is a 
penalty action, the type covered by the statute of limitations. Finally, 
TSCA, unlike the tax code analyzed in Mullikin, does not contain any 
statute of limitations, yet there is no evidence that Congress intended 
that none apply. Moreover, Congress broadly waived the govern-
ment's immunity from limitation periods for penalty actions when it 
enacted section 2462. This broad waiver should obviate application of 
strict construction to section 2462. 
B. EPA Proceedings Under TSCA and a Strict Construction of 
Section 2462 
Absent strict construction, EP A's administrative assessment of 
penalties under TSCA easily falls within the language of section 2462 
as an action "for the enforcement of [a] civil ... penalty."81 ALJs 
who found section 2462 inapplicable to TSCA had applied strict con-
struction, while those who held that section 2462 barred administra-
tive complaints issued more than five years after the violation found 
strict construction inappropriate. 82 This section asserts that even a 
strict construction of enforcement should include administrative as-
sessments of penalties under TSCA. 
The Agency claims that only the district court collection action 
constitutes an action for the enforcement of a civil penalty. 83 It argues 
that the administrative proceeding is not one which "enforces" a pen-
alty; it merely assesses one. If the defendant refuses to pay, EPA must 
file a district court action. Thus the district court, not the Agency, 
compels payment. 84 EPA further argues that a penalty cannot be "en-
forced" in the first instance until one has been assessed. 85 
These arguments ignore the common understanding of enforce-
ment and the reality of EP A's primary role in TSCA enforcement. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines enforcement as "[t]he act of putting 
something such as a law into effect; the execution of a law; the carry-
ing out of a mandate or command. "86 EP A's assessment of penalties 
81. 28 u.s.c. § 2462 (1988). 
82. Compare In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 8 (Aug. 7, 1989), modi-
fied, TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6 (Feb. 28, 1992) and In re Tremco, Inc., No. 
TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13 (Apr. 7, 1989) with In re CWM Chem. Servs., Inc., No. 
II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 21 (Nov. 6, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal No. 91-6, 
1992 WL 90321 (Mar. 23, 1992) and In re District of Columbia (Lorton Prison Facility), No. 
TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 12 (Aug. 30, 1991). 
83. See, e.g., 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06, at *19. 
84. 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06, at *21. 
85. 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06, at *20. 
86. BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1990); see also In re 3M Co., TSCA Appeal No. 
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under TSCA fits this definition. 87 Upon discovery of a violation and 
further investigation, a penalty is put into effect at the administrative 
level. Once the assessment becomes final, the violator generally pays 
it. 88 For the vast majority of TSCA violators, then, EP A's administra-
tive proceedings constitute the only enforcement activities they en-
counter. Moreover, the district court cannot review the amount, 
validity, or appropriateness of the penalty; it only executes EP A's ac-
tion. 89 Thus, the administrative level carries out most, and in some 
cases all, of the steps necessary to put a penalty "into effect." 
Legislative history reveals that Congress considers EP A's assess-
ment of penalties under TSCA to be an enforcement proceeding. The 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works stated in con-
nection with the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act: 
The bill authorizes the Administrator to issue administrative penalty or-
ders. The government should have the flexibility to enforce the Act ad-
ministratively, in addition to its powers to enforce the Act in court. 
Administrative enforcement authority is provided in numerous other en-
vironmental statutes; it often affords a more expeditious and less costly 
means for resolving compliance problems. See, the Clean Water Act; the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and the Toxic Substances 
Control Act. 90 
The Conference Committee on the 1990 amendments also endorsed 
the view that EP A's activities constitute enforcement actions when it 
issued the Joint Explanatory Statement. It stated, "EPA is authorized 
to initiate a range of enforcement actions for a number of violations of 
specified sections and titles of the Act. Included is authority to issue 
administrative penalty orders .... " 91 Consistent with these reports, 
EP A's authority to assess penalties administratively under the Clean 
Air Act appears under the section of the statute entitled "Federal en-
forcement. "92 The congressional reports on the Clean Air Act amend-
ments indicate that administrative assessment of penalties serves the 
90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6 (Feb. 28, 1992) (quoting definition of "enforce" from same source); 
Lorton Prison, No. TSCA-111-439, at *14 (quoting 5th ed.). 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 9-~3. Including administrative action within the defi-
nition of enforcement is not novel. The introductory note of the Third Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Low states, "[e]nforcement is often carried out through executive or administrative 
rather than judicial action; enforcement is thus not merely an aspect of adjudication .•.. " 
REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 230 (introductory note to pt. IV) (1987). 
The Restatement goes on to define '~urisdiction to enforce" as "to induce or compel compliance 
or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts or by use of 
executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action." Id. § 40l(c). 
88. See supra note 20. 
89. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(4) (1988). 
90. S. REP. No. 228, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3879. 
91. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 952, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1990) (emphasis added), reprinted 
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3879. 
92. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
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same enforcement purpose as, and is just an alternative enforcement 
procedure to, an action in federal court.93 Because courts have uni-
formly construed section 2462 to govern district court actions to assess 
penalties under the other environmental statutes,94 courts should con-
sider TSCA administrative actions to be "enforcement" actions as 
well. 
If an administrative proceeding under TSCA constitutes "an ac-
tion, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine," the lan-
guage of section 2462 requires that it apply to TSCA.95 
Administrative proceedings under TSCA must be subject to section 
2462 unless Congress explicitly states that they are not. Because Con-
gress has not done so, section 2462 must govern administrative assess-
ment of penalties under TSCA. 
Moreover, section 2462's language manifests Congress' intent that 
section 2462 apply to statutes such as TSCA that contain no statute of 
limitations. As a district court recently noted, the language of section 
2462 "strongly implies that the Congress intended Section 2462 to ap-
ply precisely to actions ... in which the substantive right of action 
under which the United States sues does not contain an express limita-
tions period."96 The court stated that it would be absurd to say sec-
tion 2462 does not apply because the substantive act does not say that 
it does. By its language, section 2462 establishes a default mechanism 
93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
94. See United States v. Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 169 (7th Cir. 1982) (Rivers nnd 
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1988)); United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406, 1408-09 (E.D. 
Va. 1990) (Clean Water Act); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 30 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1778, 1780 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 1989) ("It is well established that actions for civil penalties under 
the CWA are governed by the five-year federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462."); United 
States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1123 (D. Md. 1987) (Clean Air Act); United States v. C 
& R Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (CWA). 
Section 2462 was enacted to limit governmental actions to enforce penalties, but courts uni-
formly apply § 2462 to citizen suits under the CWA rather than borrowing state statutes of 
limitations in order to be consistent with EPA enforcement. See, e.g., Public Interest Research 
Group v. Powell Dulfryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 1018 (1991) (overruling a long line of District of New Jersey cases holding that no statute of 
limitations applied to citizen suits under the CWA); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 
F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir. 1987); National Wildlife'Fedn. v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 
989, 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1987), revd. on other grounds, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club 
v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (D. Md. 1985), affd., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. 
Supp. 440, 447-50 (D. Md. 1985). The Ninth Circuit applied § 2462 to citizen suits because 
§ 2462 "clearly applies to enforcement actions brought by the EPA" and applying it to citizen 
suits "promotes the important federal policy of uniformity and adequately enforcing Clean 
Water Act." Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d at 1521. Likewise, the Chesapeake 
court noted, "[p]roceedings initiated by the EPA would almost certainly be subject to a five-year 
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462, and the limitations period for citizens should not be 
shorter." Chesapeake Bay Found., 608 F. Supp. at 448; see also infra note 133 (listing adminis-
trative actions in which § 2462 was applied). 
95. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
96. United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F. Supp. 354, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
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that can only apply to actions such as TSCA which do not contain 
statutes of limitations.97 
C. Section 2462's Codification in Title 28 
EPA frequently argues that section 2462's codification in title 28 
precludes its application to purely administrative proceedings.98 Title 
28, sometimes referred to as the Judicial Code,99 contains seven 
lengthy parts dealing mainly with the judiciary and judicial procedure. 
The Agency cites sections 451, 1355, and 2461(a) of title 28 as evi-
dence that Congress intended section 2462 to refer only to proceedings 
in federal courts.100 
Section 451 appears in a chapter entitled "General Provisions Ap-
plicable to Courts and Judges" found in part I of title 28, which is 
entitled "Organization of Courts."101 The section provides the defini-
tion of "court of the United States."102 EPA correctly notes that the 
definition of court in this chapter about courts does not include admin-
istrative tribunals. However, this fact does not clarify section 2462's 
construction. Section 2462 appears in part VI of title 28 entitled "par-
ticular proceedings," in a chapter entitled "Fines, Penalties, and For-
feitures." Section 2462 does not even contain the word "court" as 
defined in section 451. Instead it refers to "action[s], suit[s], or pro-
ceeding[s]," which logically could include administrative proceedings. 
If title 28 lacked any reference to administrative proceedings, the 
argument that Congress only meant proceedings in federal courts 
might be more persuasive. However, title 28 does contain references 
to administrative proceedings. Chapter 157 of the title governs Inter-
state Commerce Commission orders and chapter 158 deals with orders 
of other federal agencies. These chapters demonstrate that Congress 
did not totally exclude administrative proceedings from the "judicial 
title." If Congress intended to limit section 2462 to actions in federal 
courts, it easily could have drafted the statute that way instead of us-
ing the broad language that it did. 103 
97. See Island Park, 191 F. Supp. at 367. 
98. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
99. E.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.l (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. 
Ct. 459, 463 (1991); Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 155 n.l (1990). 
100. Complainant's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 27, 
In re CWM Chem. Servs., Inc., No II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 21 (Nov. 6, 
1991); Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 12, In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 
TSCA LEXIS 8 (Aug. 7, 1989) (interlocutory order). 
101. 28 u.s.c. § 451 (1988). 
102. 28 u.s.c. § 451 (1988). 
103. See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (1992) ("Congress' decision to use the 
broader phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in § 54l(c)(2) [of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 54l(c)(2) (1988)] strongly suggests that it did not intend to restrict the provision" to 
include only state law.); United States v. Smith, 111 S. Ct. 1180, 1189 (1991) ("We must con-
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Section 2461(a), the second section cited by EPA, provides: 
"Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for 
the violation of an Act of Congress without specifying the mode of 
recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil ac-
tion." 104 EPA argues that this provision, which immediately precedes 
section 2462, indicates that Congress intended section 2462 to apply 
only to federal court actions. Section 2461(a), however, cannot con-
trol section 2462's construction for TSCA enforcement because TSCA 
does specify the mode of enforcement and recovery. It provides EPA 
with primary enforcement responsibility and· the ability to bring an 
action in district court for recovery of the penalty. Further, no direct 
evidence exists that section 2461(a) was intended to restrict section 
2462. It is illogical to argue that Congress intended section 2461(a) to 
limit section 2462 because section 2462 by its language covers all fed-
eral punitive actions, not just those for which Congress did not specify 
the mode of recovery or enforcement. 
Finally, EPA points to section 1355, which provides that district 
courts have original jurisdiction over any action or proceeding for the 
recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, exclusive of 
the courts of the states.105 Nothing in title 28 links this provision with 
section 2462. Section 1355 appears in a chapter entitled "District 
Courts; Jurisdiction" in part IV of title 28; the chapter deals only with 
jurisdiction and venue of federal courts. This provision has two main 
functions. First, it partially defines the jurisdiction of the district 
courts as required by Article III of the Constitution.106 It also states 
that federal courts, not state courts, have jurisdiction to hear penalty 
actions arising under federal laws. This section does not say that an 
administrative proceeding cannot be considered a proceeding for the 
enforcement of a civil penalty under section 2462. 
Unfortunately, direct legislative history surrounding section 2462 
sheds no light on whether Congress intended to include administrative 
proceedings within section 2462. Indirect history, however, implies 
that Congress did not intend to preclude section 2462's application to 
administrative proceedings. Since 1948, several congressional com-
mittees have stated that section 2462 applies to administrative actions 
to assess penalties. For example, the Senate Report which accompa-
nied the bill that extended the Export Administration Act (BAA) and 
elude that if Congress had intended to limit the protection under the [Federal Employees Liabil-
ity Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(l)] to employees not 
covered under the pre-Act statutes, it would have said as much."); Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 
928 F.2d 86, 87-88 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that statute of limitations for claims of age discrimi-
nation did not run from discovery because if Congress had intended a discovery rule, it could 
have written one); supra text accompanying note 73. 
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) (1988) (emphasis added). 
105. 28 u.s.c. § 1355 (1988). 
106. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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provided for the imposition of civil penalties by the Department of 
Commerce stated: 
This bill does not prescribe any period following an offense within which 
the civil penalty must be imposed. It is intended that the general 5-year 
limitation imposed by section 2462 of title 28 shall govern. Under that 
section, the time is reckoned from the commission of the act giving rise 
to the liability, and not from the time of imposition of the penalty, and it 
is applicable to administrative as well as judicial proceedings.107 
Twenty years later when Congress again extended the EAA, the con-
ference report confirmed the application of section 2462 to the Com-
merce Department's administrative proceedings.108 
Congressional declarations regarding the application of section 
2462 to administrative penalty actions under export controls facilitate 
an understanding of section 2462's application to TSCA because the 
enforcement framework under the EAA substantially resembles that 
under TSCA. Under both statutory schemes, administrative assess-
ment of penalties serves as a mandatory prerequisite to an action in 
federal court. 109 Although the Supreme Court has stated that subse-
quent legislative observations do not form part of the legislative his-
tory and the intent of the enacting Congress governs, 110 they should 
carry significant weight in the absence of direct evidence of legislative 
intent. 111 The reports demonstrate at a minimum that Congress did 
not intend to preclude absolutely the application of section 2462 to 
administrative proceedings. 
The recent amendments to the Clean Air Act also demonstrate a 
107. S. REP. No. 363, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965), repn"nted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1826, 
1832. The House report accompanying the amendment contains a similar statement. See H.R. 
REP. No. 434, 89th Cong., .1st Sess. 5 (1965). 
108. H.R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 64, (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
108, 126. "The intent of the committee of conference is that the Commerce Department must 
bring its administrative case within 5 years from the date the violation occurred." Id. 
109. See SO U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1988). The acts differ in that following an administrative 
finding, the Export Administration Act requires the district court to determine de novo all issues 
ofliability. If the administrative proceeding under export controls can be viewed as an "enforce-
ment" action when the district court reevaluates the matter, surely EPA's final assessment of 
penalties under TSCA can be viewed as a proceeding for the enforcement of a civil penalty. 
110. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. 
McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977) and Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 
(1977)). In Oscar Mayer, respondent unsuccessfully attempted to override "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence of the enacting Congress' intended meaning with a later committee report. 
111. Importantly, the Oscar Mayer Court did not state that subsequent committee reports 
are irrelevant. 441 U.S. at 758. Indeed, the Court subsequently recognized the value ofposten-
actment congressional pronouncements in the absence of other evidence of congressional intent. 
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) ("[W]hile arguments predicated upon 
subsequent congressional actions must be weighed with extreme care, they should not be rejected 
out of hand as a source that a court may consider in the search for legislative intent."); Seatrain 
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) ("[W]hile the views of subsequent 
Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, such views are entitled 
to significant weight, and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is 
obscure.") (citations omitted). 
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congressional intent not to preclude administrative proceedings from 
section 2462's time bar. EP A's new authority to issue civil penalties 
under the Clean Air Act is expressly made subject to section 2462 by 
statute.112 Yet, extensive reports accompanying the Amendments to 
the Clean Air Act do not mention the insertion of section 2462 in the 
statutory language.113 The lack of explanation and the fact that the 
reference to section 2462 in the statute is made parenthetically may 
indicate that Congress believed section 2462 would apply to EPA ad-
ministrative actions under the Clean Air Act without additional con-
gressional action. Congress presumably inserted the reference to 
section 2462 for clarification purposes. If true, this is further evidence 
that Congress does not distinguish administrative proceedings from 
court actions for application of section 2462. 
D. Federal Courts and Section 2462's Application to Administrative 
Penalty Actions 
Although no federal court has squarely addressed the issue of 
whether section 2462 applies to administrative assessment of penalties, 
several courts have stated or assumed that it does. 114 In an unreported 
decision, United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 115 the District Court of New 
Jersey addressed the issue of when the district court action under 
TSCA accrues for purposes of section 2462. The court believed sec-
tion 2462 must apply separately to each prong of TSCA enforcement. 
Applying section 2462 to EP A's penalty action protected the defend-
ant from stale claims and curbed the potential for agency abuse. On 
the other hand, the court reasoned, applying section 2462 separately to 
the district court collection phase and holding that the action accrues 
upon the completion of the administrative process ensures that the 
Agency has ample time to collect the penalty it has assessed. 116 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). This section provides in part: 
At any time after the expiration of 30 days following the date on which such notice of a 
violation is issued, the Administrator may, without regard to the period of violation (subject 
to section 2462 of Title 28) ... (B) issue an administrative penalty order in accordance with 
subsection (d) of this section, or (C) bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of 
this section. 
113. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 952, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3867; S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385. 
114. E.g., United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 914 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1987); Caldwell v. Gur-
ley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645, 651 (8th Cir. 1985); United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal 
Co., 676 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1982); Lancashire Shipping Co. v. Durning, 98 F.2d 751, 752-53 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 635 (1938); United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1460, 1467-68 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988); see also United States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp. 
916, 918 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (stating that defendant made no argument that the Secretary unrea-
sonably delayed administrative proceedings and therefore action is brought within the time 
period). 
115. 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988). See supra note 41 and infra 
notes 191-93 and accompanying text. 
116. N.O.C., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467-68. 
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Two court of appeals decisions involving the Export Administra-
tion Act (EAA) support the N. 0. C. court's analysis. As discussed ear-
lier, 117 the EAA, like TSCA, contains a mandatory administrative 
penalty assessment step followed by an optional proceeding in district 
court. In both United States v. Core Laboratories, Inc. 118 and United 
States v. Meyer, 119 the courts had to decide when section 2462 begins 
to run for district court actions to recover penalties assessed adminis-
tratively under the EAA. Both courts recognized that section 2462 
applied to the prior administrative action. In Meyer, the court stated, 
"[b]oth parties concede that, as applied to the EAA, this statute at 
least requires that any administrative action aimed at imposing a civil 
penalty must be brought within five years of the alleged violation."120 
The First Circuit's statements in Meyer cannot be dismissed as 
mere dicta. First, the court characterized the question before it as 
whether section 2462 provides an additional five years to enforce a 
penalty in district court. 121 The Department of Commerce began the 
administrative action within three and a half years of the violation. By 
the time the administrative process had ended, more than six years 
had passed since the violation. Assuming section 2462 applied to the 
administrative prong, the court believed it would be incongruous for 
Congress to have allowed the government five years to file an adminis-
trative penalty action, while permitting the time to expire before the 
government could realize the benefits of the administrative proceed-
ings by recovering the penalty in a district court action.122 The court 
also noted that because requiring initiation of the administrative pen-
alty action within five years of the violation abundantly satisfies legiti-
mate concerns for repose, fair notice, and preservation of evidence, its 
holding that the district court action accrues at the conclusion of the 
administrative prong causes no injustice to the defendants. 123 
Similarly, the court in United States Department of Labor v. Old 
Ben Coal Co. 124 seemed to assume that section 2462 applies to admin-
istrative penalty actions when reaching a decision on whether section 
2462 barred a district court action to recover a penalty assessed by the 
117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
118. 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985). 
119. 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1987). 
120. Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914. The court expounded, "[a]lthough the analytical underpin-
nings of this interpretation seem somewhat wobbly, the view is eminently reasonable as a matter 
of policy and is supported by two distinct pronouncements of subsequent legislative committees 
that chose to comment on the matter." 808 F.2d at 914. In a footnote, the court noted that the 
parties' interpretation found substantial support in an earlier decision of the Second Circuit. 808 
F.2d at 914 n.2 (referring to Lancashire Shipping Co. v. Durning, 98 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.), cert 
denied, 305 U.S. 635 (1938)). 
121. Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914. 
122. 808 F.2d at 920. 
123. 808 F.2d at 922. 
124. 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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Secretary of Labor under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act of 1969.125 The court held that section 2462 did not apply to the 
Department of Labor's effort to recover a penalty, which was akin to a 
collection action.126 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that 
the defendant did not need the protection of a limitations period for 
the district court action because the administrative penalty action, 
which had commenced within five years of the violation, had already 
fulfilled the purposes behind the statute of limitations.127 
In yet another context, a court suggested, without deciding, that 
section 2462 may apply to administrative assessment of penalties. In 
Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 128 a lessor brought an action against a 
lessee for a declaratory judgment to determine their respective rights 
and obligations vis-a-vis liability to EPA under the Clean Water 
Act. 129 The lessee claimed that section 2462 barred the government 
from bringing an action against the lessor, and therefore no contro-
versy existed on which the district court could base jurisdiction to hear 
the matter. The Eighth Circuit responded that because the Coast 
Guard had already commenced substantial administrative penalty 
proceedings within five years of the violation, the government still 
could prevail.130 The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the 
lessee was responsible for any liability to EP A. 131 
In contrast to these decisions which suggest that section 2462 ap-
plies to administrative decisions under a variety of statutes, no federal 
court has ever said that section 2462 does not apply to administrativ~ 
proceedings.132 Moreover, Alls within EPA have ruled that section 
2462 applies to administrative penalty assessments under other envi-
ronmental statutes such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA).133 Under RCRA, EPA can choose whether to file an 
immediate action in· district court or to assess a penalty administra-
125. Pub. L. 91-173, tit. I, § 109(a)(4), 83 Stat. 742, 756 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. 
§ 820(j) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). 
126. Old Ben Coal, 676 F.2d at 261. The court stated that even if§ 2462 did apply to the 
district court action, the action could not accrue until the administrative proceeding ended be-
cause no cause of action exists unless a violator refuses to pay. 
127. 676 F.2d at 261. 
128. 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985). 
129. 33 u.s.c. § 1321 (1988). 
130. Caldwell, 155 F.2d at 651. 
131. 755 F.2d at 648. The district court awarded EPA $76,758.60 for cleanup costs. United 
States v. Gurley Ref. Co., 788 F. Supp. 1473, 1478-79 (E.D. Ark. 1992). 
132. In Mullikin, the government specifically raised the issue of whether an administrative 
penalty assessment constitutes an action for the enforcement of a penalty under § 2462. How-
ever, because the court held that Congress did not intend § 2462 to apply to actions under§ 6701 
of the IRC, the court declined to reach the issue. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 929-30 
n.17 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992). 
133. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988). E.g., In re Waterville Indus., No. RCRA-I-87-1086, 1988 
RCRA LEXIS 20 (June 23, 1988); see also In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA Appeal No. 88-3, 
1990 RCRA LEXIS 25 (Aug. 7, 1990). The CJO decided the case on different grounds, but 
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tively, 134 but once the Agency decides to proceed administratively, the 
procedures are nearly identical to those under TSCA.135 Because both 
the administrative procedures and guiding principles between RCRA 
and TSCA are similar, the language of section 2462 cannot support a 
distinction between them. If EP A's administrative penalty assessment 
under RCRA fits within the definition of a proceeding for the enforce-
ment of a civil penalty, so should its action under TSCA.136 Thus, 
EPA actions under TSCA should be subject to section 2462's bar. 
E. TSCA Administrative Proceedings, Section 2462, and Purposes of 
Statutes of Limitations 
Just as the language of section 2462 requires its application to 
EP A's assessment of penalties, 137 so do its purposes. Statutes of limi-
tations such as section 2462 serve three overlapping functions: (1) to 
ensure fairness and repose to defendants; (2) to promote the effective-
ness and efficiency of the judicial system; and (3) to promote societal 
stability.13s Applying section 2462 only to district court proceedings 
does not advance these purposes.139 
Ensuring fairness to the defendant ranks highest among the vari-
ous purposes of statutes of limitations.140 The Supreme Court long 
noted in a footnote that applying § 2462 to administrative penalty actions would be consistent 
with Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act enforcement. 
134. See supra note 11. 
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1988). 
136. In In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13 (Apr. 7, 1989), an 
AU explained why he holds that § 2462 does not apply to TSCA when he had previously held 
that§ 2462 does apply to RCRA. Under RCRA, EPA has a choice of proceeding administra-
tively to assess a penalty or filing an immediate action in district court and § 2462 clearly applies 
to a RCRA action in federal court. Therefore, the AU reasoned, § 2462 also should apply to 
administrative penalty assessments, presumably to prevent EPA from choosing a forum based on 
the statute of limitations issue. However, the language of § 2462 cannot support this distinction 
based on policy. 
137. See discussion supra section 11.B. 
138. Carie G. McKinney, Note, Statute of Limitations for Citizen Suits Under the Clean 
Water Act, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 195, 202 (1986); see also, e.g., Gretchen W. Anderson, Uni-
fonnity in Clean Water Act Enforcement: Applying a Five Year Federal Statute of Limitations to 
Citizen Suits, 6 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 49, 70-71 (1987); M. Patrick McDowell, Note, 
Limitations Period for Federal Causes of Action After the Judicial Improvement Acts of 1990, 44 
,VAND. L. REv. 1355, 1367 (1992); Neil Sobol, Comment, Detennining Limitation Periods for 
Actions Arising Under Federal Statutes, 41 Sw. L.J. 895, 897-98 (1987). 
139. See United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(recognizing that the administrative- proceedings under the federal coal mine health and safety 
statute, not the district court proceedings, fulfill the purposes of putting the alleged violator on 
notice and preventing the loss of evidence); see also United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 922 
(1st Cir. 1987) ("All in all, construing§ 2462 to require the initiation of administrative proceed-
ings [under the EAA] within five years of the date of the alleged violation ..• abundantly satisfies 
any legitimate concerns for repose, fair notice, and preservation of evidence."). 
140. United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 921 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that the primary 
purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent unjust surprise through the revival of claims long 
after evidence has been lost and memories have faded); Sobol, supra note 138, at 897. 
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ago stated: 
Statutes of limitations ... in their conclusive effects are designed to pro-
mote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that 
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if 
one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to 
defend within the period of limitations and that the right to be free of 
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. 141 
More recently, the Court, relying in part on the above case, declared 
that "[ s ]tatutes of limitations ... represent a pervasive legislative judg-
ment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend 
within a specified period of time .... " 142 Further, the Senate report 
concerning the enactment of section 2415, a general statute of limita-
tions for government contract and tort actions, contains a supporting 
statement by the Comptroller General expressing the belief that "as a 
matter of fairness, persons dealing with the Government should have 
some protection against an action by the Government when the act 
occurred many years previously."143 Section 2462, like section 2415, 
protects entities from government delay. 
These Supreme Court and legislative pronouncements embody 
three separate fairness concerns: repose, notice, and preservation of 
evidence needed for defense. The concern for repose signifies that at 
some point, the defendant should have a right, absent fraud or other 
special circumstances, to be free from stale claims.144 To accomplish 
repose, a statute of limitations provides a definite time within which 
rights must be asserted. But without an application of section 2462 to 
the administrative action, an alleged violator could never enjoy repose. 
EPA would have unlimited power to delay bringing penalty actions 
even for decades after -.:he alleged violation. "An interpretation of a 
statute purporting to set a definite limitation upon the time of bringing 
action . . . which would nevertheless, leave defendant subject indefi-
nitely to action for the wrong done, would . . . defeat its obvious 
purpose."145 
Thus, courts should not interpret section 2462 to exclude EPA ad-
141. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); 
see also Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983); United States v. Kubrick, 
444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). 
142. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (1979) (emphasis added). 
143. S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 
2508. 
144. United States v. Core Labs., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1985). 
145. Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 65 (1926). In Reading, the Court construed§ 6 of 
the Federal Employers Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 66 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 
U.S.C. § 56 (1988)), which provided that no action could be maintained unless commenced 
within two years from the day the cause of action accrued. The plaintiff insisted that the limita-
tion period ran not from the death of the victim but from the appointment of the estate adminis-
trator. The Court rejected the argument because the plaintiff could put off applying for the 
appointment of the administrator and consequently decide when the statute runs. The Court 
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ministrative actions, which would result in no definite time limit 
within which actions must begin. If section 2462 does not require 
BP A to file its administrative complaint within five years, the violator 
must look endlessly over its shoulder, waiting for the threatened ac-
tion to begin, yet ignorant of the extent of its ultimate liability. The 
uncertainty of liability over an extended period of time may cause it to 
invest cautiously in its operations, leading to operational inefficiencies 
and eventual noncompetitiveness. Application of section 2462 pre-
vents BP A from dangling liability over a defendant, chilling its 
actions. 146 
Sometimes an entity does not know that it has violated TSCA. 
The concern with repose, therefore, does not even come into play. 
However, in this case, statutes of limitations prevent unnecessary loss 
to defendants by forcing the agency to act when it learns of the viola-
tion, providing notice to the defendant. The defendant can then mini-
mize any harm caused by its actions. In re CWM Chemical Services, 
Jnc. 147 best illustrates this point. CWM alleged that as early as 1981 
or 1982, EPA knew the composition of certain sludge CWM was re-
ceiving for disposal at its facility. The Agency obtained its informa-
tion from the entity which produced the sludge, and therefore its 
information may have been superior to that of CWM. Yet, EPA 
waited until March 1991 to file an administrative complaint against 
CWM for improper disposal and then sought over seven million dol-
lars in penalties.148 If true, this is a prime example of unjust surprise 
to the defendant's and the public's detriment. If BP A had initiated a 
claim against CWM in 1982, CWM may have been able to correct the 
problem and avoid massive liability. 
While BP Ns concern for public health and its reputation may pro-
vide some incentive for the Agency to act even in the absence of a 
statute of limitations, CWM demonstrates that agency inertia some-
times can be more powerful. Further, without section 2462, TSCA 
provides a built-in incentive for BP A to delay notifying the violator. 
TSCA provides that for continuing violations each day counts as a 
separate violation; as each day passes, the defendant could be liable for 
up to an additional $25,000.149 The defendant need not even know of 
recognized that permitting the plaintiff to control events occurring prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations defeats its purposes. Reading, 271 U.S. at 65. 
146. United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1467 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 
1988). 
147. No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 21 (Nov. 6, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal 
No. 91-6, 1992 WL 90321 (Mar. 23, 1992). 
148. Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 23, CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-
0213. 
149. 15 U.S.C. § 2615{a)(l) {1988). 
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the violation.150 Thus, permitting EPA to bring actions at any time 
can lead to astronomical liability even for an entity that did not realize 
it had committed a violation. The potential for agency abuse under 
TSCA was a key factor in the N. 0. C. court's decision that section 
2462 applies separately to the administrative enforcement step. The 
court agreed with the defendant that the potential for abuse "must be 
checked by a stem application of limiting statutes."151 
Finally, fairness to the defendant encompasses the ability to obtain 
or preserve evidence needed for its defense.152 No one doubts that 
claims become more difficult to defend with the passage of time. 153 
This is especially true in the corporate context. Not only does one 
encounter the usual problems of faded memories and the unavailabil-
ity of documents, but in the era of corporate cutbacks and early retire-
ments, many witnesses are no longer employed by the defendant.154 
Most employees no longer stay with one employer for their entire ca-
reer.155 With the passage of time, "best known addresses" retained by 
personnel departments may prove unreliable for former employees 
who are not receiving pension benefits, and fewer of the employees 
who were familiar with the events giving rise to the violation are easily 
accessible to the defendant. As employees leave, many documents, 
which constitute the corporate memory, become lost or destroyed.156 
Yet, historic efforts to comply with TSCA, compliance policies, and 
the inadvertence of a violation are all relevant to penalty determina-
tions.157 Without a time limit on EPA, the defendant will have greater 
difficulty proving these potential mitigating factors. In other cases, a 
150. If an entity knowingly violates TSCA, it is subject to criminal prosecution. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2615(b) (1988). 
151. N.O.C, 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41. 
153. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); supra text accompanying notes 
140-41; infra text accompanying notes 160-64. 
154. See e.g., John Burgess, IBM Plans More Job Cuts, Calls Its First Layoffs Likely, WASH. 
Posr, Dec. 16, 1992, at Al, A9 (reporting that IBM will cut back 25,000 jobs in 1993 and bring 
its staffing down to 275,000 from a peak of 400,000 in 1985); Laura Fowlie, Inefficient Operations 
Force Big 3 to Rebuild Engines, FIN. POST, Dec. 26, 1992 (stating that new GM CEO's job will 
be to cut another 30,000 or so employees, mainly through early retirement and attrition); John 
Holusha, Dupont Sets A Charge of $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at C4 (reporting 
$275,000 million charge for plant closings and early retirement). 
155. Labor Secretary Lynn Martin hailed a new unemployment benefit law which became 
effective January l, 1993, stating, "Because •.• most workers will change careers many times in 
their lives, pensions that follow workers from job to job and from company to company will add 
to the flexibility and competitiveness of each individual worker." Martin Says Employees Will Be 
Helped by Provisions of Unemployment Benefits Law, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1269 (July 13, 1992); 
Another Take on Corporate Layoffs and Staff Loyalty, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Sept. 24, 1992 
(Executive Update; Your Employees), at 1 (quoting Peter Drucker as saying that massive layoffs 
by corporations have "ended middle-management loyalty if there ever was any"). 
156. For a discu5sion of these problems, see In re District of Columbia (Lorton Prison Facil-
ity), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 12, at *32 (Aug. 30, 1991). 
157. See In re 3M, Co., TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6, at *9-25 (Feb. 28, 
1992). 
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defendant may have records dating back several decades without the 
availability of witnesses to explain apparent inconsistencies. 
Potential prejudice to the defendant resulting from these factors 
becomes particularly pronounced in the administrative arena where 
the same agency serves as both prosecutor and judge. As one AU 
commented, "exposure to the same field of regulation inevitably re-
sults in the development of a point of view which, unconsciously or 
otherwise, influences the initial decision and, in some cases, the con-
duct of the hearing."158 Although Congress and administrative agen-
cies have taken steps to improve the independence of ALls, their 
efforts have not achieved total success.159 
BP A may suffer some of the same consequences of delay as defend-
ants. Certainly, the Agency experiences personnel changes and may 
lose certain records. However, BP A decides which cases to prosecute. 
While preparing for prosecution, it may concentrate its attention on 
information it needs and neglect to retain other information which 
could be useful to the defendant. Once BP A finally issues its adminis-
trative complaint, the defendant, not the Agency, will be called upon 
to explain discrepancies in the records. 
The lack of reliable witnesses and documents also frustrates the 
second purpose of statutes of limitations - promotion of the effective-
ness and efficiency of the judicial system. In United States v. 
Kubrick, 160 the Court recognized that statutes of limitations "protect 
defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the 
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, 
whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, dis-
appearance of documents, or otherwise."161 Fresh testimony ensures 
more reliable factfinding and enhances the efficiency, accuracy, and 
effectiveness of the judicial system.162 Stale claims cannot easily be 
presented or adjudicated.163 This has led the Supreme Court to de-
clare: "Statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the 
158. Paul N. Pfeiffer, Hearing Cases Before Several Agencies - Odyssey of an Administrative 
Law Judge, 21 ADMIN. L. REv. 217, 221 (1975). 
159. Karen Y. Kauper, Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A 
Model Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 537 (1985) ("At the 
federal level, each ALJ serves one agency, hearing cases arising under that agency alone. This 
close association of ALJs with administrative agencies may lead to agency proceedings that are 
neither objective nor well reasoned."); L. Hope O'Keefe, Note, Administrative Law Judges, Per-
formance Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Ac-
countability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 591, 612 (1986) (noting that although ALJs are 
independent of prosecutorial staffs, the number of ALJs, staffs, workloads, vacations, and geo-
graphic assignments are within agency control). Kauper further asserts that corrective measures 
adopted by Congress, such as performance evaluations by an independent agency, have not 
achieved the goal of ALJ independence. Kauper, supra, at 537-38. 
160. 444 U.S. 111 (1979). 
161. Kubrick. 444 U.S. at 117 (emphasis added). 
162. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980). 
163. S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 
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contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental to a well-or-
dered judicial system."164 Applying section 2462 to TSCA adminis-
trative proceedings promotes adjudicative accuracy and efficiency by 
ensuring that defendant's liability and the appropriateness of the pen-
alty are determined before the evidence becomes stale. 
In TSCA enforcement, problems caused by stale evidence would 
fall most heavily on the administrative proceeding because at the dis-
trict court level EPA only has to prove that it assessed a certain pen-
alty and that the defendant refused to pay it. Nevertheless, whether 
section 2462 applies still affects the federal courts because prior to the 
district court proceeding, the defendant can appeal as of right to the 
court of appeals. 165 The court of appeals would then also have to 
struggle with the lack of fresh testimony. Requiring EPA to begin its 
proceedings within section 2462's time limit avoids this problem. 
Finally, statutes of limitation promote societal stability. Third par-
ties may be reluctant to deal with companies that face the uncertainty 
of unsettled claims.166 This is particularly true when the amount of 
the claim can escalate for years. Statutes of limitations require that 
adverse parties tackle and resolve a dispute or unsettled claim within a 
reasonable period of time so that entities can devote their energy to 
their primary business. 
Statutes of limitations enhance fairness, judicial effectiveness, and 
societal stability. As the Court has repeatedly declared: "[a] federal 
cause of action 'brought at any distance of time' would be 'utterly re-
pugnant to the genius of our laws.' " 167 Courts must apply section 
2462 to administrative actions assessing penalties in order to fulfill the 
purposes of statutes of limitations. 
III. ACCRUAL OF SECTION 2462 WHEN APPLIED TO TSCA 
This Part explains how courts should apply section 2462 to TSCA. 
As a court decides how section 2462 applies to one of TSCA's enforce-
ment steps, it also should examine whether section 2462 applies to the 
other prong, and if so, when the action accrues. Deciding how section 
2462 applies by looking only at the district court proceeding could 
leave the defendant with effectively no protection from ancient claims 
by permitting EPA to control events which begin the running of the 
2503 (recommending passage of§ 2415, a statute of limitations applying to government contract 
and tort actions). 
164. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487. 
165. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
166. McKinney, supra note 138, at 202-03; see supra text accompanying notes 144-45. 
167. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 336, 342 (1805)); see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 
143, 156 (1987) (quoting Wilson in response to Justice Scalia's dissent which asserted that since 
RICO contained no statute of limitations, none applied). 
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statute. On the other hand, focusing on the administrative phase 
could permit the defendant to exhaust the time period with adminis-
trative appeals and leave the agency with inadequate time in which to 
bring a collection action. 
Several solutions to the problem are possible under section 2462. 
The administrative enforcement prong could accrue either upon viola-
tion or upon its discovery by EPA. As section 2462 is applied to the 
district court prong, 168 it could accrue upon violation, discovery, or 
upon final assessment of the penalty by EPA or the court of appeals. 
Section III.A argues that EPA must file its administrative complaint 
within five years of the violation. Section IIl.B asserts that the district 
court action should not accrue until final administrative assessment of 
penalties, provided section 2462 applies to the administrative stage as 
well. Thus, the Agency would have five years to file a district court 
collection action after the penalty assessment becomes final. 
A. Accrual of the Administrative Action 
In the context of TSCA enforcement, the administrative proceed-
ings determine the extent of a violator's liability for civil penalties.169 
With few exceptions, when referring to actions that determine the ex-
tent of defendant's liability for penalties or forfeiture, courts and Con-
gress have interpreted section 2462 and its predecessors to run from 
the date of violation, not from the time of its discovery. 170 The prece-
dent holding that section 2462 runs from violation is so overwhelming 
that in 1985, when deciding when a district court collection ~ction 
should accrue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to hold that it too ac-
crues at violation.171 It believed that the date of violation had received 
universal acceptance as the date when a claim accrued under section 
2462, citing no less than sixteen cases for this proposition.172 
Following this pervasive trend, courts generally have held that sec-
tion 2462 runs from the date of the violation in the environmental 
168. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text. 
170. E.g., United States v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 982 n.l (3d Cir. 1984); Western 
Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. S.S. President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Ancorp Natl. Servs., 516 F.2d 198, 200 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Witherspoon, 211 
F.2d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1954); The Ng Ka Py Cases, 24 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1928) (under 28 
U.S.C. § 791, the predecessor to§ 2462); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. 
Supp 1021, 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1981); FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 n.2 
(D.D.C. 1978); United States v. Appling, 239 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (S.D. Tex. 1965); United 
States v. Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 144, 147 (D. Mont. 1957), affd., 261 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1958); 
United States v. One Dark Bay Horse, 130 F. 240, 241 (D. Vt. 1904) (applying Revised Statutes 
§ 1047); see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 177-79 and accompa-
nying text. 
171. United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1985). 
172. Core Lab., 759 F.2d at 482. Reliance on these cases was misplaced, however, as ex-
plained infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
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context as well. As mentioned above,173 under other environmental 
statutes, BP A can choose whether to file an action in district court 
directly or to assess the penalty administratively. Regardless of which 
route it chooses to follow to impose penalties, EPA still must file its 
administrative or civil complaint within five years of the violation to 
ensure success. This is true for RCRA,174 the Clean Air Act,m and 
for the majority of courts that have heard penalty actions under the 
Clean Water Act (CWA).176 
A few courts have deviated from this rule in cases involving permit 
violations under the CWA. When courts routinely began to apply sec-
tion 2462 to citizen suits under the CWA, a minority of courts believed 
it would be unfair to require citizens to begin an action within five 
years of the violation, given their lack of access to the violator's facil-
ity. Until the alleged violator files a discharge monitoring report 
which reveals the violation, the public would have great difficulty dis-
covering it. Therefore, these courts held that citizens can begin ac-
tions within five years of the filing of the report. 177 Nevertheless, even 
in this situation most courts start the running of the statute from the 
date of violation.178 In United States v. Hobbs, 179 the court followed 
the minority approach of the citizen-suit cases and held that the stat-
173. See supra notes 11, 133 and accompanying text. 
174. In re Waterville Indus., No. RCRA-I-87-1086, 1988 RCRA LEXIS 20, at *9 (June 23, 
1988); see also United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460 (W.D. Okla. 1987): 
At the present time, this Court is not satisfied the Government may bring an action under 
CERCLA or RCRA without regard to the timeliness . . . . The Court cannot accept such a 
view [that the government's cause of action exists ad infinitum] and therefore declines at this 
time to strike Defendant's statute of limitations defense. 
116 F.R.D. at 467. 
175. See supra note ll2 and accompanying text; United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 
1110 (D. Md. 1987). 
176. United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 30 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1778, 1780 (N.D. Ohio 
July 12, 1989) ("It is well established that actions for civil penalties under the CWA are governed 
by the five-year federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462.") (citations omitted); see, e.g., 
United States v. C. & R. Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. W. Va. 1982). 
177. E.g., Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Dulfryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991) (overruling a long line of District of New Jersey 
cases holding that no statute of limitations applied to citizen suits under the CWA); Northwest 
Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency, 30 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1117 (D. Or. 1989); 
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech. Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 
1986). 
178. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1523 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(discussing the district court rulings); Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 21,498, 21,501 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 29, 1988); National Wildlife Fedn. v. Consumers Power Co., 
657 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987), revd. on other grounds, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988); 
Connecticut Fund for the Envt. v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 212-13 (D. Conn. 1985); 
Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985), ajfd., 847 F.2d 1109, 1124-25 
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enters., 618 F. Supp. 532, 
535-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 
179. 736 F. Supp. 1406 (E.D. Va. 1990), ajfd, 947 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 
s. Ct. 2274 (1992). 
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ute of limitations for government actions under the CWA runs from 
the filing of the discharge monitoring report. 
Courts should not follow the Hobbs analysis, however, for the rea-
soning developed in the citizen-suit context is not applicable to EPA 
actions. Unlike private citizens, the Agency has access to entities' fa-
cilities. It has broad authority under environmental statutes to con-
duct inspections, check records, and request additional information.180 
While EP A's resources are limited, five years should be ample time to 
discover permit violations. Further, because Congress charged the 
Agency with responsibility to ensure compliance with environmental 
statutes, defendants should not suffer because of the Agency's inac-
tion. Finally, if courts condone a lack of diligence by EPA, it may not 
perform diligently. 181 The Agency would have less incentive to in-
spect or investigate facilities in a timely manner if it can impose a 
penalty regardless of timing. 
No basis exists for distinguishing penalties assessed under TSCA 
from those assessed under other environmental statutes. In fact, the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works stated that Con-
gress modeled the recent amendments to the Clean Air Act enforce-
ment framework "after similar provisions in other environmental 
statutes, including the Toxic Substances Control Act."182 In TSCA, 
as in other environmental statutes, Congress provided EPA with all 
the weapons at its disposal to enable it to discover violations in a 
timely fashion. 183 Permitting EPA to delay enforcement until five 
years after it happens to discover a violation only encourages inaction 
and additional delays. If EPA diligently performs its responsibilities 
under TSCA but cannot discover the violation because an entity ac-
tively conceals it, equitable tolling would protect EP A's cause of 
action. 184 
Because discovery of the violation ultimately rests in EP A's hands, 
allowing the action to accrue upon discovery can result effectively in 
no statute of limitations. The evils that such a policy can cause al-
180. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318(a)(B), 1319(g)(l0), 1369(a) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414(a), 
7607(a) (Supp. II 1990); infra note 183. 
181. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
182. S. REP. No. 228, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 361 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3385, 3744. 
183. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1988) (power to inspect and to issue subpoenas). 
184. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946); In re District of Columbia (Lor-
ton Prison Facility), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 12, at *32 (Aug. 30, 1991). The 
AU in Lorton stated: 
[I]n response to any argument that a respondent may wrongfully conceal violations of 
TSCA and thus allow the five year limitation to expire, the equitable doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment which is read into every statute of limitations could be applied to toll the stat-
ute in cases where the required elements of fraudulent concealment are present. 
No. TSCA-IIl-439 at *32 (footnote omitted). 
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ready have been demonstrated.185 Starting the running of the limita-
tions period upon discovery would especially compromise the 
defendant's ability to obtain evidence needed for a proper defense. 
The majority of record retention requirements under TSCA are five 
years or less. 186 Thus, initiation of an action only one day past five 
years places the defendant at a disadvantage. If the defendant de-
stroys records in accordance with statutory retention requirements, it 
no longer has documents it needs for its defense. 
No corresponding benefit from delay outweighs the potential injus-
tice. The public could achieve satisfaction knowing a violator ulti-
mately has been punished and may benefit from the deterrent effect of 
indeterminate liability. The Supreme Court has admonished, how-
ever, "[i]n compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to 
assume that their sins may be forgotten." 187 Further, the public re-
ceives greater benefit from efficient and prompt enforcement of TSCA. 
The longer EPA delays taking action against entities that improperly 
use, store, or dispose of toxic substances or fail to disclose risks, the 
longer the public will be exposed to the risks represented by such im-
proper practices. Both the public and the alleged violator benefit 
when EPA is required to begin an enforcement action within a specific 
time after the violation occurs. 
In sum, overwhelming authority urges that the administrative ac-
tion should accrue upon violation.188 No corresponding policy justi-
fies deviating from this authority. Congress intended that EPA "carry 
out [TSCA] in a reasonable and prudent manner."189 Five years pro-
vides EPA with a broad period for enforcement while not unduly bur-
dening industry. 190 
185. See supra notes 139·67 and accompanying text. 
186. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 704.11 (1992) (3 years); 40 C.F.R. § 704.25(f) (1992) (5 years); 40 
C.F.R. § 704.33(g) (1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. § 704.95(f) (1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 704.104(g)(l) (1992) (3 years); 40 C.F.R. § 710.37 (1992) (4 years); 40 C.F.R. § 720.78(a), (b) 
(1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. § 721.40 (1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. § 721.125 (1992) (5 years); 40 
C.F.R. § 761.ISO(c), (e) (1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. § 761.209 (1992) (3 years). But cf. 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 717.15(d), 761.180(a),(b),(d),(f), 763.94 (1992) (imposing longer periods for certain records 
relating to PCBs and asbestos). 
187. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985). 
188. Some violations, such as a failure to do something which TSCA requires, can be charac· 
terized as continuing violations. For these violations, each day counts as a separate violation for 
which the violator can be subject to additional penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(I) (1988). One 
ALJ held that this section only refers to the amount of penalties and not to when the statute 
runs, and barred all violations beginning more than five years before the complaint even though 
the violations allegedly continued into the five-year period. In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 
TSCA-111-322, 1991 WL 328113, at *2-3 (Dec. 23, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal No. 92-1, 1992 
WL 118796 (May 12, 1992) (holding general statute of limitations does not apply to TSCA 
administrative penalty proceedings). Section 2462, however, should bar only those days of viola· 
tions occurring outside the five-year period in cases of actual continuing violations. 
189. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (1988). 
190. See Anderson, supra note 138, at 71. 
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B. Accrual of the District Court Action 
The final issue to be resolved is when the district court action ac-
crues, thus starting the second five-year clock. Theoretically, several 
possibilities exist: upon violation or discovery, with or without tolling 
during the administrative process, or upon the completion of the ad-
ministrative process. The best-reasoned court decisions provide that if 
an administrative proceeding is a mandatory prerequisite to the dis-
trict court action, and the agency must file the administrative com-
plaint within five years of the violation, the district court action does 
not accrue until the administrative procedure is complete. 
In United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 191 the only federal court to decide 
when the district court action accrues under TSCA held that it accrues 
upon completion of the administrative process. The court found that 
an action accrues from the last act necessary to give a party a cause of 
action. Under TSCA, this occurs when a penalty has been finally as-
sessed and all appeals are exhausted. Until EPA has imposed a pen-
alty it has nothing to recover in district court. 192 The court was 
particularly concerned that if the clock began running from the time 
of violation, the period could expire even before the administrative ac-
tion ended. It found nothing "within the context of [TSCA] actions 
which would prompt it to ... adopt a rule which prevents collection of 
[TSCA] penalties by virtue of the length of the proceeding necessary to 
assess them."193 
The N. 0. C. court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States. 194 Crown Coat involved a suit 
by a government contractor contesting the government's rejection of 
an adjustment under the "changes clause" of the contract. The gov-
ernment contract required parties to submit disputes to a contracting 
officer with appeal to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 
and to "exhaust these procedures before filing an action in federal court. 
The Court held that the action accrued at the end of the administra-
tive process; until then, the plaintiff had no right to file a district court 
action. 195 When an action accrues must be " 'interpreted in the light 
of the general purposes of the statute and of its other provisions, and 
with due regard to those practi~al ends which are to be served by any 
191. United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988). 
192. N.0.C., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467-68. 
193. 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467. In N.O.C., EPA filed an administrative complaint 
within a year of the violation and assessed a penalty two years later. However, appeals by the 
defendant to the CJO, Third Circuit, and the Supreme COurt consumed another three and one-
half years. EPA gave N.O.C. another year in which to pay the penalty after the conclusion of the 
appeals. By this time, seven years had passed since the violation. 
As noted above, theN.O.C. decision rests on§ 2462's application to the administrative tier as 
well. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
194. 386 U.S. 503 (1967). 
195. Crown Coat, 386 U.S. at 511-12. 
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limitation of the time within which an action must be brought.' " 196 
Allowing the limitation period to run from completion of the contract 
would have an unfortunate impact, the Court noted. The administra-
tive procedure could be so protracted that the plaintiff could lose the 
right before he had it. 197 Therefore, the action must run from the con-
clusion of the administrative proceedings. As noted above, this is the 
same concern that motivated the N. 0. C. court. 
Under the analogous Export Administration Act, two courts of ap-
peals reached conflicting conclusions on when the district court action 
accrues for purposes of section 2462. The Fifth Circuit in Core Labo-
ratories 198 felt compelled by precedent to find that the district court 
proceeding accrued upon violation. However, the cases on which it 
relied involved statutes which contained no mandatory administrative 
step like the EAA and TSCA.199 The cases cited by the court had held 
that the initial action which assesses or imposes penalties or forfeitures 
must begin within five years of the violation.200 The First Circuit rec-
ognized this shortcoming in United States v. Meyer. 201 The Meyer 
court found that logic, the plain language of section 2462, and consid-
erations of fairness prevented it from following the Core Laboratories 
result. First, like the Crown Coat and N. 0. C. courts, the Meyer court 
believed the district court action cannot possibly accrue until an en-
forceable administrative penalty exists. 202 The court noted that the 
use of the word " 'enforcement' in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 is not without 
significance; ... [it] presupposes a penalty to be enforced."203 The 
Core Laboratories interpretation could require the government to file 
an action in federal court before a final penalty had been assessed. 
Further, the Meyer court found that fairness to the government 
required that the statute of limitations for the district court action be-
gin running only at the end of the administrative proceedings.204 Once 
the government begins administrative proceedings, the timing of that 
process is largely beyond the Agency's control. If the defendant 
delayed administrative proceedings, the government could lose its 
right to recover the penalty in district court through no fault of its 
own even before it had a right to file.205 The court believed Congress 
196. 386 U.S. at 517 (quoting Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 62 (1926). 
197. 386 U.S. at 514. 
198. United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985). 
199. Core Lab., 759 F.2d at 482; see United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 916 (1st Cir. 
1987). 
200. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text; see also Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. 
United States, 345 U.S. 59 (1953) (construing Portal-to-Portal Act, not§ 2462). 
201. 808 F.2d 912, 916 (1st Cir. 1987). 
202. Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914. 
203. 808 F.2d at 915. 
204. 808 F.2d at 919. 
205. 808 F.2d at 915, 919. The court relied extensively on the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
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would not have allowed the government five years to file an adminis-
trative action but failed to provide it time to realize the benefits of the 
administrative proceedings. 206 Several subsequent courts, including 
the N. 0. C court, have adopted. the Meyer rationale ~hen applying 
section 2462 to district court actions;207 no court has followed Core 
Laboratories. 
One earlier district court decision under the CWA is relevant to 
this inquiry. In United States v. C & R Trucking Co., 208 the court held 
that an action in district court accrued on the date of the oil spill even 
though a penalty had been first assessed administratively. Courts 
should not follow this decision in the context of TSCA enforcement. 
First, the C & R Trucking court did not even address the concern that 
the limitations period could expire before administrative proceedings 
are exhausted. This concern alone prevented the Crown Coat, Meyer, 
and N. 0. C courts from allowing the action to accrue prior to the com-
pletion of the administrative process. Second, the enforcement provi-
sion construed by the court in C & R Trucking concerned oil spills. 
BP A learns of an oil spill when it occurs - no real time is lost before 
discovery. In contrast, many TSCA violations involve record keeping 
or reporting violations which may take longer to detect, or conditions 
that EPA can only discover upon inspection. To prevent TSCA en-
forcement from becoming a nullity, the Agency must have the ability 
to bring an action in district court if it becomes necessary. 
Tolling the five-year period during the administrative proceedings, 
as opposed to starting a separate five-year period, would also preserve 
indefinitely the Agency's ability to bring an action in district court. 
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503 (1967). See supra notes 194-97 and accom-
panying text. The Meyer court also drew on United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 
676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the court held that even if§ 2462 applied, the cause of 
action could not accrue until the administrative proceeding ended, the penalty was assessed, and 
the violator refused to pay. For a discussion of the importance of § 2462's application to the 
administrative stage to the outcome in Meyer, see supra text accompanying notes 121-23, 139-40. 
206. 808 F.2d at 920. In fact, Congress supported this interpretation and criticized the Core 
Labs. result when it amended the Export Administration Act: 
[S]ome confusion has arisen concerning the time limits for initiating administrative actions 
and on bringing action in Federal court to collect civil penalties. 
The intent of the committee of conference is that the Commerce Department must bring 
its administrative case within 5 years from the date the violation occurred. Thereafter, if it 
is necessary for the Government to seek to enforce collection of the civil penalty, the com-
plaint must be filed in Federal court within 5 years from the date the penalty was due, but 
not paid. Any other interpretation would have the Commerce Department discover, investi-
gate, prosecute, and file a complaint in U.S. District Court to collect the penalty imposed, 
but not paid, in the administrative proceeding all within 5 years from the date of the viola-
tion. In many instances ... such a task would be impossible. 
H.R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 64 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 108, 126. 
207. United States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp. 916, 918 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (holding "[a] claim to ' 
collect an administratively imposed civil penalty cannot accrue until the penalty is administra-
tively imposed"); United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1467-68 
(D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988). 
208. 537 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. W. Va. 1982). 
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The plain language of section 2462 and precedent fail to support this 
approach, however.209 The Fifth Circuit in Core Laboratories specifi-
cally considered and rejected this tactic, citing the lack of precedent 
and the fact that tolling is an equitable doctrine which is inappropriate 
absent dilatory tactics by the defendant.210 Moreover, for large penal-
ties, EPA may want to give the violator some time to gather the funds 
prior to bringing an action to recover the penalty. If a major portion 
of the five years expired prior to EP A's discovery of the violation, 
EPA would lose this flexibility. Finally, the Agency has no incentive 
to delay bringing an action in district court to collect penalties from 
solvent companies who simply refuse to pay. Thus, the defendant does 
not need further protection, and the statute should run from the final 
penalty assessment. 
CONCLUSION 
When enacting TSCA, Congress provided no indication as to 
whether it intended section 2462's five-year limitation period to apply 
to EPA's assessment of penalties. Nor did a much earlier Congress 
clearly state whether section 2462 was meant to bar administrative 
penalty actions brought more than five years after the violation. Sec-
tion 2462's broad waiver of the government's immunity from limita-
tion periods, however, should effectively mute any remnants of the 
principle of strict construction which might restrict section 2462 only 
to federal court actions. Even utilizing strict construction, the 
Agency's administrative assessment of penalties under TSCA must be 
included within the purview of section 2462 as a "proceeding for the 
enforcement of a penalty," because nearly all of the enforcement activ-
ity under TSCA takes place at the administrative level. 
A decision that section 2462 does not apply to EP A's assessment 
of penalties would be contrary to established precedent and practice 
under other environmental statutes. Further, applying section 2462 
only to district court actions under TSCA results in effectively no limi-
tations period at all. Commencement of the administrative action, 
which must precede the district court action, lies solely within EP A's 
control. If the Agency can delay enforcement indefinitely, it can rob 
industry of the benefits which section 2462 was designed to provide: 
freedom from having to defend claims when evidence no longer exists, 
repose, and prevention of an unfair surprise of substantial liability. 
Failing to apply section 2462 to EP A's assessment of liability frus-
trates goals of efficient and effective enforcement ofTSCA. A five-year 
209. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text. But cf Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1523 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the rule in the Ninth Circuit is that the 
statute is tolled during administrative proceedings if they are prerequisites to review in federal 
court). 
210. United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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time bar provides BP A with an incentive to inspect, investigate, and 
promptly enforce alleged violations of TSCA. In contrast, no statute 
of limitations encourages BP A to do nothing and allow liability to ac-
cumulate. When evidence becomes stale with time, both parties must 
expend more resources to discover evidence and reconstruct events 
which occurred many years previously and risk unfair determinations 
of liability. 
The optimal solution is to apply section 2462 to BP A's administra-
tive enforcement of penalties from the date of the violation's occur-
rence to curb potential agency abuse and delay and to protect 
defendants from having to defend stale claims. Similarly, a determina-
tion that the district court action does not accrue until BPA's assess-
ment becomes final ensures that BP A will have ample time to discover 
a violation, assess liability, and collect a penalty it has assessed. 
